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INTRODUCTION
COMPARED TO WHAT? ASSESSING THE QUALITY OF
DISPUTE PROCESSING
MARC GALANTER*
In the past dozen years, interest in Alternative Dispute Resolution
("ADR") has inspired a burst of creative innovation and experimenta-
tion. Compared to earlier crusades for alternatives, the contemporary
ADR movement is more informed by empirical learning, more theoreti-
cally sophisticated and more ambitious in scope. It advocates change
not only for the domains of the minor and marginal but for the legal
heartland.
The ADR movement has accelerated and popularized a salutary
shift in the discourse about law and disputing, a shift that reflects wider
intellectual currents. The notion that current legal arrangements em-
body a single right way to handle disputes has been drained of credibil-
ity. We have learned to see legal institutions as part of larger ecology in
which various dispute institutions interact and affect one another. As
these interconnections become common knowledge, those who would
design orjustify legal institutions must accept responsibility not only for
the small world of adjudication but for the larger world of disputing and
bargaining in which it is set.
That dispute processing arrangements are contingent and mallea-
ble has moved from academic insight to practical maxim. But once we
accept that dispute institutions might be redesigned to maximize bene-
fits and reduce costs, we are committed to comparative assessment. To
evaluate a given dispute institution we have to compare its performance
with that of modified and alternative modes of resolving (and generat-
ing) particular kinds of disputes. Such comparisons are attended by a
host of methodological and conceptual difficulties.1 The perplexities of
comparison are compounded when we realize that an encounter or in-
jury could be crystallized into very different kinds of disputes and could
be handled in very different kinds of institutions. But although each
strategy of comparison is subject to serious problems, comparative as-
sessments are as unavoidable in practice as they are difficult in theory.
Thus ADR has propelled us into a situation in which policy-makers
cannot avoid making deliberate if fallible choices among alternative ways
of processing disputes. Can inquiry give us any guidance about how
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1. See M. GalanterJudges and the Quality of Settlements (1989) (working paperJE-
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such choices should be made? The many reasons for preferring one dis-
pute mechanism over another can be reduced to two basic arguments.
The first of these, which we might call the "production" cluster, is that
one or another mechanism will produce "more" with less expenditure of
resources. Thus we find arguments that a given device will increase the
number and speed of resolutions and lower their cost. A great deal of
talk about alternatives consists of claims about production effects. Due
to the infirmities of selection and measurement that often attend reform
undertakings, there is probably a tendency to overestimate the degree to
which programs achieve such production effects. 2
Even where it can be shown that one process is cheaper and faster
than another, such a demonstration is necessarily incomplete, for it is
necessary to ask whether what is obtained for the lower cost is equally
desirable. We arrive at the question of the benefits or qualities that we
attribute to the rival arrangements. This brings us to our second great
cluster of arguments-assertions about the superiority of alternative
processes or the outcomes that they produce. For example, it may be
argued that a given process is superior because it increases the parties'
satisfaction, encourages the re-establishment of friendly relations, is
more suffused by social norms, fosters integrative solutions, leads to
more compliance, generates useful precedents, and so forth. These as-
sertions about beneficial characteristics are "quality" arguments. I use
the term "quality" as shorthand for the valued aspects of the process,
including but not confined to justice, and including but not confined to
those aspects that admit of quantification. The term was adopted to
summarize and emphasize the wide range of valued characteristics, apart
from cost, time and institutional convenience, that are implicated in dis-
puting. Although quality arguments, explicit or tacit, are everywhere in
discussions of dispute resolution, much less attention has been given to
analyzing and appraising quality effects than to the more readily measur-
able production effects.
To explore the theoretical and practical issues surrounding these
neglected issues of quality, the Disputes Processing Research Program
at the University of Wisconsin organized a workshop on "Identifying
and Measuring the Quality of Dispute Resolution Processes and Out-
comes" that was held in Madison, July 13 and 14, 1987.3 The Workshop
brought together practitioners and academics for two days of intensive
discussion of beliefs and practices about quality issues in dispute
processing. We thought this uncharted territory could best be explored
by preserving a spontaneous, brainstorming character. Participants
were encouraged to share their perceptions and perplexities, but not to
2. See the classic exposition of this point by Campbell, Reforms as Experiments, 24
AMER. PSYCH. 409 (1969).
3. The workshop was supported by the University of Wisconsin's Dispute Processing
Research Program, under a grant from the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, and by
the National Institute for Dispute Resolution. The planning committee consisted of How-
ard Bellman, John Esser, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Catherine Meschievitz, Judith Resnik,
David Trubek, and the present author.
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prepare papers. Instead, we commissioned distinguished scholars in
several disciplines (law, philosophy, political science, psychology, and
sociology) to report on the proceedings from their several perspectives.
The present Symposium consists of those reports and John Esser's re-
view of the evaluations literature on dispute resolution. They are
neither a record nor a revision of what was said at the Workshop; instead
they are individual responses to those discussions. We hope that they in
turn will contribute to a richer and more coherent discourse about the
assessment and comparison of dispute processes.
To put these reports in perspective I would add a few observations
on the context of the quest for quality. First, the discussion of "quality"
is not to be subsumed under the discussion of ADR, as if whatever it is
alternative to (presumptively, adjudication) can be taken as un-
problematic in quality. Although the issue of assessing performance was
raised by the claims of ADR's proponents and the challenges of its crit-
ics, the thrust of the quality discussion is not to put ADR in the dock but
to challenge the quality credentials of every dispute institution, includ-
ing the most established "traditional" ones.
Second, it is important not to be distracted by the fiction of a radical
split between ADR and "traditional adjudication." Most ADR is not lo-
cated in autonomous institutions that operate independently of the
norms and sanctions of the legal system. Instead ADR is typically situ-
ated near legal institutions and dependent upon legal norms and sanc-
tions. Correspondingly, most of what goes on in and around courts is
not "traditional adjudication" if that means the decisive application of
legal norms to fully presented specific cases. Instead we find maneuver-
ing, bargaining, and (often) mediation in the shadow of possible adjudi-
cation-and the expense and risk of obtaining it. That ADR and
adjudication reside in distinct normative worlds is a persistent element
in the mythology of the partisans of each, in spite of ample evidence of
the pervasive continuities.
Third, curiously those dispute institutions that flourish and enjoy
relative autonomy tend to be omitted from discussions of ADR. Our
social institutions are honeycombed by indigenous forums that elabo-
rate and enforce complex codes of conduct-in hospitals, schools, con-
dominiums, churches, the NCAA and a multitude of other settings.4 Far
more disputing is conducted within these indigenous forums than in all
the free-standing and court-annexed institutions staffed by arbitrators,
mediators and other ADR professionals. This profusion of indigenous
law reminds us that the world of disputing includes much more than
traditional adjudication and the new ADR institutions.
Fourth, we should resist the pervasive mischaracterization of ADR
as informalism. The displacement of bi-lateral negotiation by court-an-
nexed arbitration or a summary jury trial marks not a decrease but an
increase in proceeding through prescribed forms. Nor does it mark a
4. The significance of these forums is discussed in Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms:
Courts, Private Ordering and Indigenous Law, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1 (1981).
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decrease in the involvement of professionals or the reliance upon state
coercion. ADR is not so much informalism as "short form formalism;"
not so much deprofessionalization as a change in professionals. But it is
a species of de-regulation: the tie of procedures and sanctions to deci-
sive application of public rules is loosened.
Fifth, once we appreciate that an encounter or injury may be crystal-
lized into very different kinds of disputes and may be handled in very
different kinds of institutions, we recognize that sorting disputes by their
suitability to particular dispute processes is not a technical exercise but a
political choice of which kinds of disputes deserve which kinds of re-
sponse, which in turn reflects our commitments about the good society
and the good life.
Sixth, if disputes are contingent and malleable, what kind of knowl-
edge is possible about the quality of their processing? Strikingly, the
evaluation experts at the workshop made no claim to provide definitive
objective answers to quality questions, but offered their technology as a
resource for competing programs inspired by different politics of jus-
tice. But if talking quality is ultimately talking politics, it doesn't follow
that talking politics is talking quality. We still have much to learn by the
arts of systematic comparison and measurement.
We seem to be entering a period of intense debate about which dis-
putes should be addressed in the courts and which diverted elsewhere.
For example, should social security disputes be removed from the
courts? Should major business disputes be encouraged to depart to pri-
vate forums? What kind of "alternative" tracks should be attached to
the courts? And what kind of supervision and review of alternatives
should the courts undertake? All of these questions turn on what we
have called the quality issues. Debate about quality is inevitable.
Even though these issues are complex and multi-dimensional, they
can be advanced though not resolved by careful analysis and by empiri-
cal measurement. We can bring a whole repertoire of quality concepts
and techniques of inquiry to bear on specific kinds of disputes. We need
specified and contextualized studies in which institutional alternatives
are compared not in terms of the supposed unvarying characteristics of
dispute methods, but in terms of a relevant array of "quality" issues. If
our choices are inevitably political we should aspire to a politics about
real alternatives not imaginary ones.
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